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FRACTURING REGULATION APPLIED 
HANNAH WISEMAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the drilling of the first commercial oil well in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania, in 1859,1 a long and profitable history of fossil fuel 
development in America has unfolded. Throughout this history, there 
have been bursts of attention to both the positive and negative effects 
of domestic development.2 Few energy issues have sparked as much 
recent attention, however, as a once little-known technique called 
hydraulic fracturing—also called fracing, fraccing, fracking, or 
hydrofracking.3 Hydraulic fracturing exists in many forms, but its 
central purpose is to crack the formation surrounding an gas or oil 
well to encourage more gas or oil to flow through the well.4 The 
 
 †  Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Professor Wiseman 
extends her thanks to the Energy Institute of the University of Texas for funding the research 
that produced a white paper entitled, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, 
from which this article builds. The author thanks Joel Daniel, Chad Davis, Nikki Pasrija, 
Matthew Peña, Jeremy Schepers, and Molly Wurzer of the University of Texas School of Law 
for their very dedicated research efforts, which identified much of the violation and 
enforcement information described in the white paper and in this article. 
 1.  See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20 
Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf; Ross H. Pifer, 
Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania Case Law Upon the Sesquicentennial of the 
United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 47, 48 (2010). 
 2.  The blowout of BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, for example, sparked a 
variety of studies and proposals for regulatory improvement. See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON 
STUDY GRP., THE MACONDO BLOWOUT 3RD PROGRESS REPORT (2010), available at 
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSG_ThirdProgressReportFinal.pdf; Hari M. 
Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 1077, 1077 (2011). 
 3.  See Christopher Kulander, The States’ Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region 
American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracing, at *1, *6 (Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found., 
Paper 3A, 2011), available at Westlaw 2011 NO. 5 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 3A (noting that 
hydraulic fracturing is “known colloquially as ‘fraccing,’ ‘fracking,’ or ‘fracing’”); Coastal Oil & 
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2008) (“‘fracing,’ as the process is 
known in the industry”); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 233 n.22 (2010) (documenting different terms used to describe hydraulic 
fracturing). 
 4.  The technique also expands existing fractures in formations. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
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technologies used to coax open these cracks in the formation vary 
widely; the common technique of hydraulic fracturing in coalbeds,5 
for example, is substantially different from fracturing in densely-
packed shale and tight sands formations.6 The type of fracturing that 
has attracted the strongest recent interest from media organizations, 
academics, agencies, and politicians is the process applied to shales 
and tight sands, which is called “slickwater” (or slick water) 
fracturing.7 
Energy companies developed slickwater fracturing in the 1990s 
in the Barnett Shale of Texas and have since transferred the 
technique to shales around the country. 8 In most cases, developing a 
shale well requires construction of a well pad, which is the site that 
hosts the well and associated equipment; drilling and casing the well, 
 
AGENCY (EPA), EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING 
WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 3-4 (2004), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/completestudy.zip. 
 5.  See id. at 3-2, 3-11 (noting that 13,973 coalbed methane wells were producing in 2000 
and describing the process of fracturing a well, which requires drilling a production well in the 
coalbed, injecting a “median average injection volume” of 57,500 gallons of water per well, 
along with chemicals and fine sand for proppant). 
 6.  See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE IN THE BARNETT SHALE, 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse_barnettshale.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) 
(“Slick water fracking of a vertical well completion can use over 1.2 million gallons (28,000 
barrels) of water, while the fracturing of a horizontal well completion can use over 3.5 million 
gallons (over 83,000 barrels) of water.”); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED 
DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS 
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM, at ES-8 (2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (“It is estimated that 2.4 million to 7.8 
million gallons of water may be used for a multi-stage hydraulic fracturing procedure in a typical 
4000-foot lateral wellbore.”). Fracturing is necessary to produce gas or oil from shales and tight 
sands. See Kulander, supra note 3, at 4. 
 7.  See EPA, supra note 4, at 4-8.  For additional information on horizontal drilling, which 
typically precedes this process, see Jeffrey C. King, Selected Re-Emerging and Emerging Trends 
in Oil and Gas Law as a Result of Production from Shale Formations, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2011) (“Hydraulic fracturing is generally coupled with horizontal drilling so that as 
much of the rock as possible is exposed to the fracture stimulation.”); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
PROT., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW 1 (2010) [hereinafter HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
OVERVIEW], available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGMPortalFiles/ 
MarcellusShale/DEP%20Fracing%20overview.pdf (“Horizontal well drilling and completion is 
another technology used in the Marcellus Formation to increase the productivity of a gas well 
by maximizing the length of the wellbore through the target formation.”). 
 8.  See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (“In 1997, the first slick water 
frac (or light sand frac) was performed and found to be very successful in stimulating the 
Barnett Shale.”). Slickwater fracturing is differentiated from water fracturing because it uses 
both large volumes of water and a gel or other friction reducer. Jay A. Rushing & Richard B. 
Sullivan, Improved Water-Frac Increases Production, E&P, Oct. 12, 2007, 
http://www.epmag.com/archives/features/661.htm. 
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often using horizontal drilling techniques;9 punching holes in small 
segments of the well far beneath the surface; and pumping a solution 
of water and chemicals down the well at high pressure.10 This process 
forces the solution out through the perforations in the well, fracturing 
the surrounding formation and expanding any existing fractures.11 
While conducting a slickwater fracturing operation, operators also 
pump a proppant, such as sand, into the well to prop open the 
fractures and allow oil or gas to flow up through the well’s production 
casing—a tube inserted into the well for the purpose of isolating the 
oil or gas and allowing it to flow up the well.12 
The specific technique of slickwater fracturing varies 
substantially among formations and among wells within one 
formation. Engineers at well sites drill different well depths, fracture 
wells at different pressures, and apply a variety of chemical types and 
quantities based on many factors, including the density and 
composition of the formation being fractured.13 Despite differences 
 
 9.  PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DRILLING FOR NATURAL GAS IN THE MARCELLUS 
SHALE FORMATION 1 (2008), available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/ 
BOGMPortalFiles/MarcellusShale/MarcellusFAQ.pdf (stating, partially incorrectly, that 
fracturing the Marcellus Shale “requires” horizontal drilling); J. DANIEL ARTHUR & MARK 
LAYNE, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE 
MARCELLUS SHALE 7–8 (2008), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials 
_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf (describing both horizontal and vertical completions in the 
Marcellus and explaining that horizontal wells are more productive); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY 
REPORT 8 (2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 90-DAY REPORT], available at 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081811_90_day_report_final.pdf  (noting the 
importance of horizontal drilling combined with fracturing to develop shales). Horizontal 
drilling involves an operator drilling straight down into a formation and then deviating the drill 
bit. See Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the Marcellus Shale, at *1, *4 
(Rocky Mountain Mineral L. Found., Paper 2, 2010), available at Westlaw 2010 NO. 5 RMMLF-
INST PAPER NO. 2. Multiple horizontal wells can be drilled from one pad, with the horizontal 
portions of the wellbores radiating away from each other. Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: 
Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011). 
 10.  See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-91 to -97 (describing 
hydraulic fracturing procedure); HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW, supra note 7 
(describing the slickwater fracture process). 
 11.  N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-95. 
 12.  Id.; see GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that the 
production casing is inserted into the “target formation” (the formation from which oil or gas is 
produced) or the top of the target formation). 
 13.  See, e.g., N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-30 (noting that at 
the drilling stage, factors such as “formation depth and thickness, mechanical and physical 
factors associated with the well construction program, production experience in the area, [and] 
lease position and topography” affect the drilling pattern); cf. id. at 5-88 (noting that “for any 
given area and formation, hydraulic fracturing design is an iterative process”). 
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among specific slickwater fracturing techniques, the process as a 
whole has fundamentally changed American oil and gas production. 
It has made fracturing the norm in gas development,14 encouraged 
new horizontal drilling techniques,15 and enabled abundant 
production of shale oil in certain areas of the country.16 In reshaping 
the domestic energy landscape, the technique has introduced several 
new stages to the development process, requiring larger volumes of 
water17 and new types of chemicals.18 Just as importantly, it has 
allowed operators to drill thousands of new oil and gas wells, thus 
expanding the impacts of traditional drilling to new sites.19   
 
 14.  Approximately ninety percent of all new gas wells are fractured. See Ben Casselman & 
Russell Gold, Drilling Tactic Unleashes a Trove of Natural Gas—And a Backlash, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.uppermon.org/news/Other/WSJ-Backlash-
21Jan10.html. 
 15.  Kulander, supra note 3, at 5 (“The prevalence of horizontal drilling has . . . increased 
the importance of fracing as boreholes can now traverse through a much longer portion of a 
targeted horizon instead of the interval covered by vertical or slant drilling, making the return to 
the operator in increased production worth the cost of mobilization of a fleet of fracing 
equipment.”); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 90-DAY REPORT supra note 9, at 8 (noting that “the 
combination of two technologies working together—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling—made shale gas commercial” in 2002 and 2003). 
 16.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TECHNOLOGY-BASED OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
PLAYS: SHALE SHOCK! COULD THERE BE BILLIONS IN THE BAKKEN? 1 (2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/features/ngshock.pdf (describing “highly productive oil field discoveries 
within the Bakken Formation” enabled by horizontal drilling and fracturing). 
 17.  See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (estimating that a horizontal 
well that is fractured requires more than 3.5 million gallons of water); MARCELLUS SHALE 
ADVISORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 17 (2011), available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/ 
PublicParticipation/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryCommission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/M
SAC_Final_Report.pdf (noting that “much larger quantities of water are required for gas 
shale”); N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-93 to -94 (estimating that 
hydraulically fracturing a single shale well requires between 2.5 and 7.8 million gallons of 
water). 
 18.  See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-42 to -48 (listing 
chemical additives in hydraulic fracturing fluids); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. 
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE MINORITY STAFF, CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 13–30 (2011), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Report%204.18.11.pdf (listing hundreds 
of chemical components that were used in various hydraulic fracturing treatments between 2005 
and 2009). Fracturing prior to the 1990s often used much larger quantities of sand and gels in 
lieu of large volumes of water. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 8. 
 19.  See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WELLS DRILLED, available at 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20Drilled.gif (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2012) (showing 1751 wells drilled in the Marcellus Shale from January through 
November, 2011); R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK EAST (BARNETT SHALE) DRILLING 
PERMITS ISSUED (1993–2010), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/drillingpermitsissued.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (showing 4145 permits issued during the peak Barnett drilling year of 
2008); cf. Kulander, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that about 35,000 wells are fractured annually). 
Not all of these 35,000 wells, of course, are newly-drilled wells. 
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As fracturing has allowed more wells in new formations to be 
drilled, the sheer increase in well numbers has led to a range of 
environmental effects that can begin long before the actual fracturing 
occurs. As with any type of oil or gas well, a developer must construct 
a well pad and a road to the pad,20 drill the well,21 store drilling wastes 
at the surface in a pit or tank, and then dispose of these wastes.22 
Water for drilling must be withdrawn from surface or underground 
sources, or, if not withdrawn on site, piped or trucked in and then 
temporarily stored.23 As described in more detail in part I, drilling 
fluids and muds may spill on the surface of well pads, produced water 
may spill during transfer or leak from a surface pit, and oil from 
drilling equipment may leak onto well pads.24 Improperly cased wells 
may also leak methane at the drilling stage, causing methane to 
migrate into soil and water sources.25  
Fracturing expands these familiar risks by enabling more 
development and adds new ones unique to fracturing-related 
activities. The horizontal drilling that often precedes fracturing can 
concentrate certain environmental effects like air pollution, but can 
also have positive impacts including less surface disturbance, reduced 
erosion, and avoidance of sensitive habitats.26 Before fracturing 
 
 20.  AM. PETROLEUM INST., FREEING UP ENERGY: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: 
UNLOCKING AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 6 (2010), http://www.api.org/policy/ 
exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/HYDRAULIC_FRACTURING_PRIMER.pdf 
(describing the “land disturbance” necessary to develop a shale gas well); N.Y. DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 5-135 (describing access road and well pad 
construction). 
 21.  AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 20, at 6 (describing the “four or five weeks of rig 
work” that precede well fracturing). 
 22.  JOSEPH DANCY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY II, CHAPTER 5: SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED OIL FIELD WASTES at 
*1, *3 (1994), available at Westlaw 35A RMMLF-INST 5 (1994). 
 23.  Cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at ES-9 (“Water for 
hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it from surface water bodies away from 
the well site or through new or existing water-supply wells drilled into aquifers.”). 
 24.  Hannah Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations (Univ. of 
Texas Energy Inst., Draft White Paper, Jan. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992064. 
 25.  See, e.g., EAST RES., INC., DELCIOTTO NO. 2, SUBSURFACE NATURAL GAS RELEASE 
REPORT ROARING BRANCH, MCNETT TOWNSHIP, LYCOMING COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 10–11 
(Sept. 18, 2009) (contained in October 7, 2011, response to Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170) 
(describing gas in soil, natural springs, and wells, some of which was naturally occurring and 
some of which likely leaked from an improperly-cased well) (on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F.). 
 26.  I am grateful to Professor Bruce Kramer for his description of the positive and 
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begins, fracturing chemicals must be transported to well sites;27 these 
fluids can spill from trucks during transport28 or transfer.29 Operators 
must withdraw significantly more water for slickwater fracturing than 
for conventional natural gas drilling or other fracturing techniques, 
requiring approximately one to seven million gallons for each 
fracturing treatment.30 Expanded water use31 can affect water quality 
and reduce stream flow, thereby negatively impacting stream biota32 
and reducing long-term supply.33 Hoses moved from one water 
withdrawal site to another can introduce disease spores and invasive 
species to surface waters.34 Shipment of both water and chemicals to 
 
negative effects of horizontal drilling in his comments on my Energy Institute paper, supra note 
24. See also  NAT’L PARK SERV., POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL GAS 
RESOURCES IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.eesi.psu.edu/news_events/EarthTalks/2009Spring/materials2009spr/NatParkService-
GRD-M-Shale_12-11-2008_view.pdf (noting that horizontal drilling “could result in fewer 
impacts than conventional vertical wells due to greater flexibility in well location”); U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 34 (1999) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
BENEFITS], available at http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/environ_benefits/ 
env_benefits.pdf (describing the benefits of horizontal drilling, including producing more 
resources with fewer wells). 
 27.  NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 26, at 9 (estimating that transport of “completion fluids 
and materials” requires somewhere between 100 and 1000 truck trips to a well site). 
 28.  See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-315 (“Transportation of 
any hazardous materials always carries some risks from spills or accidents. Hazardous materials 
are moved daily across the state without incident, but the additional transport resulting from 
horizontal drilling poses an additional risk, which could be an adverse impact if spills occur.”). 
 29.  Id. at 5-81 (describing chemical transfer from trucks). 
 30.  See supra note 6. 
 31.  Much of the use is consumptive in that it fails to return the used water to the local 
basin. See SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, ACCOMMODATING A NEW STRAW IN THE 
WATER: EXTRACTING NATURAL GAS FROM THE MARCELLUS SHALE IN THE SUSQUEHANNA 
RIVER BASIN, at 1 n.2 (2009) (citing 18 CFR § 806.3 (2009)), available at 
http://www.srbc.net/programs/docs/Marcellus%20Legal%20Overview%20Paper%20%28Beaud
uy%29.pdf.PDF. 
 32.  N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-2 to -3. 
 33.  Cf. R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WATER USE, supra note 6 (“Increasing water use due to 
growing population, drought, and Barnett Shale development has heightened concerns about 
water availability in North-Central Texas.”). But see N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
supra note 6, at 6-4 (noting that “projected water withdrawals and consumptive use of water [for 
high-volume hydraulic fracturing] are modest relative to overall water withdrawals in New 
York”). 
 34.  See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-4 (“Transporting water 
from the water withdrawal location for use off-site . . . can transfer invasive species from one 
water body to another via trucks, hoses, pipelines, and other equipment.”); COLO. OIL & GAS 
CONSERVATION COMM’N, Rule 1204(a)(2), 2 C.C.R. 404-1 § 1204(a)(2) (2009) (“In designated 
Cutthroat Trout habitat . . . operators shall disinfect water suction hoses and water 
transportation tanks withdrawing from or discharging into surface waters . . . used previously in 
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well sites expands truck trips to the site, causing damage to roads and 
local traffic problems.35 Fracturing also increases the pressure on the 
well, which increases the risks of casing failure.36 Finally, during and 
after fracturing, chemicals can spill from tanks, and flowback water—
fluid that flows back up out of the well after fracturing—can be 
mishandled.37 
States have taken a variety of approaches to address these 
potential effects. Several states have begun updating their regulations, 
for example, to require stronger casing, to prevent leakage of oil and 
gas wastes from surface pits, and to prohibit the use of certain 
chemicals in fracturing.38 Furthermore, states continue to apply new 
and preexisting regulations by inspecting well sites, noting violations, 
and, in some cases, by taking enforcement action, such as issuing 
administrative orders, entering into consent orders, and imposing 
penalties.39 This article addresses these latter inspection and 
enforcement activities, exploring how state agencies have applied 
regulations to oil and gas operators. 
Part I briefly introduces state regulatory programs and provides 
examples of the types of violations that states have noted at oil and 
 
another river, lake, pond, or wetland” in order to control the introduction of disease spores.). 
 35.  NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 26, at 8–9; PENN STATE COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI., 
MARCELLUS SHALE: WHAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NEED TO KNOW 11 (2008), 
available at http://downloads.cas.psu.edu/naturalgas/pdf/MarcellusShaleWhatLocalGovernment 
Officialsneedtoknow.pdf. 
 36.  Cf. N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 6, at 6-55 (“During hydraulic 
fracturing operations, the pressure in the well is greater than the pressure in the 
formation . . . .”). 
 37.  Although this article focuses on the potentially negative environmental effects of 
fracturing and states’ application of regulations to activities that can cause these effects, it is 
important to note several positive environmental developments in addition to the benefits of 
drilling multiple wells on a pad. For a summary of these benefits, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS, supra note 26. 
 38.  See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (2008) (requiring lined pits and, in some 
situations, steel tanks for storing oil and gas wastes). 
 39.  The enforcement scheme for state environmental or oil and gas laws is complex and 
varies substantially. States often divide enforcement activity into two broad categories of 
“formal” and “informal” enforcement. See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., ENFORCEMENT 
MANUAL 12 (Revised Dec. 2004), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/ 
legal/Enforcement/chapters/chapter2.pdf; Oil and Gas Regulatory Enforcement, OHIO DIV. OF 
OIL AND GAS RES. MGMT., http://www.ohiodnr.com/mineral/enforcement/tabid/ 
17872/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). For examples of the variety of the types of 
enforcement actions taken, see General Users Guide to the COGCC Hearing Process, COLO. 
OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/Hearings/ 
HearingGuide.htm; MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEEDINGS FACT SHEET, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogs-
compliance-factsheet_262981_7.pdf. 
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gas sites since shale or tight sands development became more 
common. Part II describes the types of enforcement actions that 
states have taken in response to these violations.40 It is important to 
note that the violations and enforcement actions explored here are 
not comprehensive because full data sets from each state were 
unavailable at the time of publication. It is also important to 
recognize that the violations and enforcement actions described are 
associated with a variety of well types—Antrim Shale wells in 
Michigan, for example, require substantially different fracturing and 
drilling techniques than Barnett Shale wells in Texas.41 With these 
caveats in mind, the data described paint a preliminary picture of 
regulations beyond their text, showing that states’ notations of 
violations of environmental and oil and gas laws and resulting 
enforcement actions vary substantially. 
I.  STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AT SHALE 
GAS AND TIGHT SANDS WELL SITES 
Due to several federal exemptions for oil and gas development 
and fracturing,42 states bear the primary responsibility for regulating 
shale gas development. State regulation has garnered enhanced 
attention as drilling and fracturing have boomed, inspiring both praise 
and critique. Some commentators have focused on the exemptions 
from federal regulation that oil and gas operators enjoy and have 
argued that applicable federal regulation is inadequate to protect 
health and the environment.43 Others have proposed that 
 
 40.  The violations described in Part I include all instances where inspectors noted a 
violation or issued a notice of violation. 
 41.  See generally HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS, AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, 
UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 2–5 (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/ 
solutions/contents/Shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf (describing different shales (not including 
the Antrim) and how development practices in the shales differ; introducing the Antrim Shale). 
 42.  For discussion of federal regulation and exemptions, see James R. Cox, Revisiting 
RCRA’s Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous Oilfield Exploration and Production 
Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003). See also Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation, supra note 3, 
at 242–47 (describing the exemption of fracturing (with the exception of fracturing with diesel 
fuel) from the definition of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water Act, and 
the more general exemption of oil and gas exploration and production (or “E&P”) wastes from 
the hazardous waste portion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); id. at 242 
(explaining that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
does not apply to spills of petroleum and gas); Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and 
Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. (SIDEBAR) 1, 5–6 (2011) 
(explaining that the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act does not require 
reporting of annual releases of toxic substances from oil and gas sites). 
 43.  See, e.g., Mark A. Latham, The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for CCS, 
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municipalities, although limited in some cases by state preemption, 
must improve oversight of drilling and fracturing.44 With all the 
attention paid to regulatory content, however, it is easy to forget that, 
as thousands of new gas wells are developed each year, state agencies 
are on the ground, shaping the contours of these new and existing 
regulations through their application. To understand how existing 
regulations operate—and how proposed regulations might play out—
it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the 
implementation of regulations by states. Regulations that appear 
strong as written may have little effect as enforced while seemingly 
inconsequential regulations may meaningfully influence development 
if broadly interpreted and frequently enforced by states. This part 
provides a glimpse into regulations of well development and 
fracturing, as applied by state agencies, first by introducing state 
regulatory programs and then by describing the types of violations 
noted at shale gas and tight sands sites over the last decade. 
A.  State Regulation of Shale Gas and Tight Sands Development 
In most states, one agency—either an oil or gas or environmental 
agency—has primary authority over oil and gas development. Many 
state oil and gas commissions, which originally held this authority,  
had mandates to preserve these resources and protect the rights of 
neighboring owners, whose resources could be drained.45 In addition 
to this core conservation mandate, limited regulation for basic safety 
 
Hydrofracking, Geoengineering and Other Emerging Technologies with Environmental and 
Human Health Risks, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 58–59 (2011) (criticizing the 
Safe Drinking Water Act exemption, concluding that “the current federal regulatory approach 
is insufficient to protect human health and the environment from the risks associated with 
hydraulic fracturing,” and observing that the government has taken an “after-the-fact, 
piecemeal approach to regulation” that has “turned the precautionary principle on its head”); 
Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing: A Human Right to a 
Clean Environment, _ CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y _ (forthcoming 2013), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2007234 (noting that “[r]egulatory 
coordination is lacking with regard to unconventional natural gas extraction and its 
health/environmental impacts”). But see Kevin J. Garber et al., Water Sourcing and Wastewater 
Disposal: Two of the Least Worrisome Aspects of Marcellus Shale Development in Pennsylvania, 
13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 169, 172 (2011) (expressing some optimism about updated EPA and state 
regulations for wastewater management, the development of industry best practices, and other 
responses to risks). 
 44.  See generally John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return to 
Pennsylvania with a Vengeance: Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 45.  See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 14 (“Throughout the period 
1946 to 1960, most oil and gas producing states established a regulatory agency to 
enforce oil and gas conservation practices.”). 
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also emerged; states required the plugging of wells,46 for example, and 
promulgated basic well construction requirements to protect 
groundwater.47 As environmental concerns expanded, so too did the 
responsibility of state agencies to respond to the environmental 
effects of oil and gas development. 
Today, the state agency with primary authority over oil and gas 
development regulates issues such as the casing of wells to prevent 
groundwater contamination, the construction and maintenance of 
surface pits in which oil and gas waste is stored, and the disposal of oil 
and gas waste.48 Frequently, a second agency has limited jurisdiction 
over certain issues, such as air quality or the accumulation of low 
levels of radiation on oil and gas equipment that results from drilling 
and its associated wastes.49  
The capacity of these agencies to execute the regulations 
assigned to them varies widely. Based on a survey of a limited 
number of state agencies, the total number of field inspectors 
employed in 2011 ranged from approximately four in Maryland to 
twenty-eight in Ohio and eighty-four in Pennsylvania.50 Texas, a 
 
 46.  An operator plugs a well by pumping cement down it. If done properly, this seals the 
well, preventing water and other substances from leaking into it and gas or oil from leaking out. 
R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., WELL PLUGGING PRIMER 6–7 (2008), available at 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/forms/publications/plugprimer1.pdf. 
 47.  GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 13. 
 48.  Id. at 15 (noting that “[m]any states formed separate departments to administer overall 
environmental regulations because of the programmatic shift in emphasis toward protection of 
water and land resources” in oil and gas drilling). 
 49.  In Texas, for example, the Railroad Commission has the bulk of regulatory authority 
over oil and gas wells, but the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) 
administers air quality regulations at well sites. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., BARNETT SHALE 
INFORMATION, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) 
(explaining that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over “roads, traffic, noise, odors, 
leases, pipeline easements, or royalty payments” and that local governments and other state 
agencies control roads and traffic issues, while the TCEQ addresses “odors and air 
contaminants”). See also Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas 
Development, at 114–15 (Univ. of Texas Energy Inst., Draft White Paper, Oct. 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547 (describing how several different 
agencies often have responsibility for various forms of naturally occurring radioactive materials 
from oil and gas development). Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) can 
accumulate at oil and gas sites (and equipment that handles these materials can pick up low 
levels of radioactivity) because portions of the drilled formation, which are naturally 
radioactive, can be deposited “on well casing and in downhole equipment.” The Need and 
Desirability to Issue an Order Establishing Particular Requirements for Plugging of Wells 
Where Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) May be Present, MICH. DEP’T 
NATURAL RES. ORDER NOS. 3-6-92 & (M) 1-6-92, at 1 (1992), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogs-oilandgas-sow-3-6-92_261340_7.pdf. 
 50.  Wiseman, State Enforcement, supra note 24, at 13–14. 
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historically active oil and gas state, employed 125 inspectors in 2008 at 
its Railroad Commission—the agency with primary regulatory 
authority over oil and gas sites in the state.51 The number of staff 
employed is largely influenced by the number of wells: Maryland, 
with no hydraulically fractured shale wells to date,52 would reasonably 
expect fewer incidents than would the Texas Railroad Commission 
and would therefore hire fewer staff. Inspection and enforcement 
capacity is also affected by state budgets, agency priorities, and 
political directives from governors and legislatures. In Pennsylvania, 
for example, the Department of Environmental Protection—the 
agency tasked with enforcing most state regulations of oil and gas 
wells—increased the fees attached to the permit that each operator 
must obtain before drilling a well and used the money to hire more 
staff.53 The permit fee rose from $100 to an average of approximately 
$2850,54 and the total staff increased from 90 to 202, with 84 of these 
staff members devoted to field inspections.55 The Texas Railroad 
Commission, in contrast, has had to oversee expanding development 
with decreasing levels of funding and staffing.56 
B.  Preliminary Data on Violations  
Some state agencies tasked with executing environmental 
regulations—often in addition to ensuring oil and gas conservation 
and protecting mineral rights—have been overwhelmed by the pace 
and volume of new well development.57 In Texas, in 2010 alone, 2157 
drilling permits were issued for the shale,58 and between 2010 and 
2011, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, which is 
primarily responsible for air quality issues at well sites, received 
approximately 535 complaints associated with Barnett Shale 
 
 51.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 97 (2009), available at 
http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/82ndreports/rct/ser.pdf. 
 52.  Telephone interview by Matthew Pena with Wes McBride, Engineer, Md. Dep’t of the 
Env’t, Mining Program (July 15, 2011). 
 53.  MARCELLUS SHALE ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 65. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 66. 
 56.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 14. 
 57.  See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil from Water – The History of State Regulation, 
GREENWIRE, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/12/14/1 (quoting 
Randy Huffman, Secretary, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, “Quite 
frankly, our regulatory structure is not prepared to deal with it. . . . All of a sudden we have, 
basically, a brand new industry that shows up on the scene. We see a lot of things, that quite 
frankly, the state was not prepared for.”). 
 58.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., DRILLING PERMITS ISSUED, supra note 19. 
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development.59 In Pennsylvania, the number of wells drilled in the 
Marcellus Shale skyrocketed from 195 in 200860 to 1751 in 2011.61   
The increased number of new wells comes, in some cases, with a 
correspondingly high number of violations and enforcement actions, 
although this varies considerably among states. In Pennsylvania in 
2011, for example, the Department of Environmental Protection 
conducted 10,307 site inspections of Marcellus Shale wells, noted 
violations at 6.3% of inspected sites for a total of 1189 violations, and 
took 213 enforcement actions.62 The Texas Railroad Commission 
conducted 120,866 site inspections of all oil and gas sites in the state 
(not just Barnett Shale sites63), noted environmental violations at 
18.5% of these sites, and referred 535 violations for enforcement 
action.64 Total enforcement actions at fractured well sites in Texas in 
2010, the latest year for which a full data set was available, were 
comparatively small, at only five.65 A number of factors could 
 
 59.  Wiseman, State Enforcement, supra note 24, at 25. 
 60.  PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 2008 WELLS DRILLED, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/ 
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Website%20Pictures/2008/2008%20Wells%20Drilled.jp
g (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 61.  PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WELLS DRILLED, supra note 19. 
 62.  PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS MANAGEMENT COMPLIANCE 
REPORT (Query Range: 01/01/2011 to 12/31/2011) [hereinafter PA. 2011 VIOLATIONS AND 
ENFORCEMENTS] (downloaded Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.depreportingservices.state.pa.us/ 
ReportServer/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?/Oil_Gas/OG_Compliance (spreadsheet on file with 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.). For the purposes of this article, “enforcement” refers to any 
formal agency response to a notation that a violation occurred; enforcements identified for this 
article included administrative orders, agreed orders, agency issuance of penalties, and agency 
directives for remedial action at well sites. A violation, in turn, is defined as any instance in 
which a document noted a violation, issued a notice of violation, or identified the statute or 
regulation violated at a well site. This line is, by necessity, blurry. Often, a state might consider a 
notice of violation to be an informal enforcement action (not just a violation), as this notice 
often would be followed either by the violator’s voluntary correction of the violation or an 
administrative order. See supra note 39. 
 63. The Texas dataset described herein includes, presumably, a number of wells that were 
never hydraulically fractured because it includes all wells in the state, including conventional 
wells outside of the Barnett Shale. 
 64.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 90–91. 
 65.  See Hannah Wiseman, TEXAS VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS (2011), at PERMIT 
NOS. 31137, 0658516, 0552969, 0672613, 0683121 [hereinafter TEX. VIOLATIONS AND 
ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation and enforcement data provided by the Texas 
Railroad Commission in response to author’s query) (spreadsheet on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F., original data on file with author). Raw data inputted into the spreadsheet are from 
hard copy enforcement files provided to the author by Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Oil and 
Gas Division, Railroad Comm’n of Tex. Additionally, an enforcement case for Permit no. 
0682577 began in 2010 but was reassigned and completed in 2011. Enforcement was so low in 
part because the Commission “underwent a hiring freeze beginning in 2009 and lost personnel.” 
E-mail from Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, Oil and Gas Division, Railroad Comm’n of Tex., to 
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contribute to discrepancies in the percentage of violations that lead to 
enforcement, including, for example, whether site visits are conducted 
routinely or primarily in response to complaints; whether advance 
warning of inspections is provided; whether agencies face different 
political motivations for identifying violations and taking 
enforcement action; whether agencies have adequate staff to take 
enforcement action when violations are identified;66 and whether 
industry best practices tend to vary between regions.  
This section further examines the types of violations and 
enforcements that arose from inspections in several states with recent 
shale gas and tight sands development. To gather data on violations 
and resulting enforcement actions at shale gas wells, agency staff in 
approximately fifteen states were asked to provide data on all 
complaints, violations, and enforcements at fractured wells between 
approximately 2008 and 2011 or earlier if fracturing had been 
common for a longer time period. Some states provided no 
information, while others provided a wealth of data. Some of these 
data were not comprehensive, and some included a limited number of 
unfractured wells. Data from Michigan, for example, included all 
Antrim Shale wells; this article assumes that all of these wells were 
fractured. This information, though incomplete, still yields several 
interesting results. 
In the four states for which violation and enforcement data were 
evaluated, the most common violations of state environmental laws at 
shale gas and tight sands sites involved failures to obtain permits or 
submit reports, failures to mow weeds around wellheads or post 
proper signs, improper construction or maintenance of surface pits, 
and surface spills of various drilling materials. These results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
author, Feb. 27, 2012 (noting that “[u]nless a violation is egregious or an immediate threat, the 
RRC may allow the operator 15–30 days to correct the violation before pursuing other 
mechanisms, including seals and severances, legal enforcement, etc.”) (on file with DUKE 
ENVTL. L & POL’Y F.). 
 66.  See, e.g., E-mail from Leslie Savage, supra note 65 (in response to a question about 
why enforcement actions at hydraulically fractured well sites dropped from 2008 through 2009 
to 2011, explaining that “Legal Enforcement was down two attorneys” and that the Commission 
faced other staffing challenges). 
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Table 1. Most Common Violations at Shale Gas and Tight Sands Sites 
by Percent of Total Violations 
 
 Louisiana
67 
2009–2011 
Michigan68 
1999–2011 
New Mexico69 
2000–2011 
Texas70 
2008–2011 
Permitting & 
reporting 9.5% 0% 7.8% 32.3% 
Pit construction 
& maintenance 33.2 0.2 1.3 4.8 
Signs & labeling 23.7 32.5 18.2 1.6 
Site maintenance 0.9 22.4 0 0 
Surface spill:  
produced water 0.5 0.2 33.8 0 
Surface spill: non-
produced water 
or unidentified 
substance 
3.3 24.5 5.2 0 
 
As Table 1 shows, violations of sign and labeling requirements 
were the most common shared violations among the states analyzed. 
These violations included failures to post an identification sign with 
 
 67.  Hannah Wiseman & Molly Wurzer, LOUISIANA VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS 
(2011) [hereinafter LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation 
and enforcement data provided by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources in response 
to research assistant query) (spreadsheet on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., original data 
on file with author). Raw data from online database collected by Molly Wurzer. Louisiana 
maintains databases of compliance order initiations and compliance order paperwork; the latter 
is not uploaded until after a compliance order is resolved. Information on suspended 
compliance reports was not available. 
 68.  Hannah Wiseman & Jeremy Schepers, MICHIGAN, NEW MEXICO, AND WYOMING 
VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS (2011) [hereinafter MICH., N.M. & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND 
ENFORCEMENTS] (spreadsheet compiling violation and enforcement data provided by the 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and New Mexico Energy, Minerals, and 
Natural Resources Department in response to research assistant query) (spreadsheet on file 
with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F., original data on file with author). Raw data inputted into the 
spreadsheet are from files provided by state agencies, including agreed orders, notices of 
inspection, and field activity reports, and searches of state agency online databases, including 
New Mexico’s spill database available at https://wwwapps.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/ 
ocdpermitting//Data/Incidents/Spills.aspx. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65. 
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the well number or signs warning of poison gas,71 improperly located 
signs,72 and a lack of visible well identification signs, among others.73 
Permitting and reporting violations, which dominated the Texas 
Railroad Commission’s violations, appeared74 to involve failures to 
obtain a permit before drilling or fracturing a well,75 and failures to 
obtain approval of surface casing programs before drilling.76 Another 
common procedural violation in Texas involved operators’ failures to 
submit completion reports—which provide data about how the well 
was drilled and fractured and the formations encountered during the 
process—within ninety days of completing a well.77 
The site maintenance issues in Michigan nearly all involved 
“vegetation growing near the wellhead” that needed to be removed, 
weeds around wellheads, and seventy-five foot areas around 
wellheads that were not cleared. Michigan inspectors also 
occasionally noted “unused machinery” on well sites that required 
removal.78 
Violations with potentially substantial environmental effects 
included pit construction and maintenance problems. In New Mexico, 
for example, an inspection revealed an unpermitted pit containing 
waste that was over the pit liner, resulting in a $5000 fine.79 Allowing 
contents in a pit to sit above the liner level can cause pit contents to 
seep into the soil or water around the pit.80 In Louisiana, a pit 
 
 71.  MICH., N.M. & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68. 
 72.  See, e.g., LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 237610 
(noting incorrectly placed “[w]ell sign on rear entrance to well”). 
 73.  See, e.g., MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68 
(listing 73 violations for “no visible well identification signs”). 
 74.  Texas violation data do not provide field inspector notes but rather list the 
regulation(s) violated. 
 75.  TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NOS. 0637567, 
232848, 233600, DOCKET NOS. 09-0259689, 09-0259690 (noting that a permit was issued after the 
operator paid a $14,500 penalty, and noting a violation of 16 Tex. Admin. Code 3.5C). 
 76.  Id. at PERMIT NOS. 226145, 226156, 0626246; DOCKET NO. 09-0251997 (noting 
violations of 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.5C, 3.13(b)(2)(A)(I)). 
 77.  TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65. 
 78.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, PERMIT NO. 
46116. 
 79.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-045-32300. 
 80.  For all well sites (including those at which fracturing may not have occurred), New 
Mexico maintains a list describing “cases where pit substances contaminated New Mexico’s 
groundwater,” which in 2008 contained more than 200 active cases of groundwater 
contamination. See N.M. ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP’T, OIL CONSERVATION 
DIV., CASES WHERE PIT SUBSTANCES CONTAMINATED NEW MEXICO’S GROUNDWATER, 
DATA (as of Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/ 
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containing drilling wastes81 similarly lacked adequate freeboard—
space in the pit above the waste to prevent overflow—and staff noted 
“excessive accumulation of produced water, waste oil, and trash in 
[the] reserve pit.”82 In other cases in Louisiana, oil tank seal valves 
were “not equipped with the proper locking and sealing devices,”83 
and various levels of pollutants like selenium or arsenic in reserve pits 
exceeded regulatory levels when the pits were tested at closure.84 
Of perhaps more concern than leaking pits are the high 
percentage of violations in several states associated with surface 
spills.85 The spills arose from a number of incidents, including 
malfunctioning86 and frozen tanks87 in New Mexico that released 
produced water, and an overflowing tank that spilled 142 barrels of 
produced water, only 70 of which were recovered.88 In Louisiana, an 
operator used tanks intended for fracturing substances to store 
produced water; a “gauging error” caused an overflow, and the 
produced water migrated into a “ditch and swampy area.”89 Incidents 
in Pennsylvania, although not yet comprehensively analyzed to 
indicate the most common types of violation, also involved a number 
of spills, including discharges of ethylene glycol to a well pad and 
 
GWImpactPublicRecordsSixColumns20081119.pdf. 
 81.  The violation referred to a reserve pit, and reserve pits typically contain drilling 
wastes. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2011) (defining a reserve pit as a “[p]it used in 
conjunction with drilling rig for collecting spent drilling fluids; cuttings, sands, and silts; and 
wash water used for cleaning drill pipe and other equipment at the well site”). 
 82.  LA.VIOLATIONS AND Enforcements, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 239783. 
 83.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 240741. 
 84.  Id. at PERMIT NOS. 240662, 238448, 238637, 239603 (indicating violations of 43:XIX 
LA. ADMIN. CODE § 313). 
 85.  Indeed, the percentage of spill violations in Texas may be underreported, as some 
violations of 16 Texas Administrative Code § 3.8d, involving improper storage or disposal of oil 
and gas wastes, may represent spills. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d) (providing accepted 
and prohibited types of pits and disposal methods); TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, 
supra note 65 (describing Texas Railroad Commission violations, which described § 3.8(d) 
violations without explaining the specific activity that caused the violations). 
 86.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT 
NO. 30-045-33599, INCIDENT NO. nRMD0931632498; PERMIT NO. 30-039-30192, INCIDENT NO., 
nBP0804351507. 
 87.  Id. at PERMIT NOS. 30-039-26070, INCIDENT NO. nDGF0503437776; 30-039-25478, 
INCIDENT NO. nBP0918932635. 
 88.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-039-25947, INCIDENT NO. nDGF0100955815. 
 89.  LA.VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 238585. 
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flowback to a drainage ditch,90 small drilling-fluid spills,91 and a 
fifteen-gallon spill of diesel to a well pad.92 
Taken together, these state violations raise several issues. Each 
state tends to have a different category of most common violation, 
suggesting a number of possible reasons for variance: the types of 
operators drilling wells, assuming large operators with more 
experience cause fewer violations;93 climate and other local factors, 
assuming states with more precipitation may experience more pit 
overflows; different agency focuses and capabilities; or a lack of 
adequate testing or monitoring equipment to identify problems such 
as soil and water contamination or air pollution. Notably, all of the 
most common violations are readily identifiable via a quick survey of 
the site. Although other incidents, such as groundwater 
contamination and air quality impacts, may in fact occur less often, 
these violations’ lower frequencies may also be a function of their 
difficulty to detect. State agencies should consider the effectiveness of 
their inspections at assessing the full range of effects, including those 
that are not readily identifiable.  
States should not expect that their overburdened agencies will 
adequately monitor thousands of new well sites—and new 
technologies—with existing staff. Agencies and legislatures alike must 
consider creative solutions for raising funds, such as Pennsylvania’s 
approach of increasing permit fees,94 to ensure that agencies have the 
capacity to inspect in the first place. While this point is frequently 
noted, it cannot be overemphasized. 
Another source of variation among the states, discussed below, 
involves the range of enforcement actions taken in response to these 
violations, which has important implications for deterrence, agency 
funding (in states agencies that are partially funded through fees and 
penalties), and industry’s internalization of the environmental costs 
created by drilling and fracturing. 
 
 90.  PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62, at PERMIT NO. 035-21179. 
 91.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 035-21229. 
 92.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 035-21178. 
 93.  This assumption may not always hold true. In Texas, for example, 16 of the 51 
Railroad Commission violations noted between 2008 and 2011 for fractured wells involved XTO 
Energy, an ExxonMobil subsidiary. See TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65; 
XTO ENERGY, http://www.xtoenergy.com/en/home.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
 94.  See text accompanying supra notes 54–55. 
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II.  ENFORCEMENT 
When states note a violation of a regulation, they do not always 
follow up with enforcement,95 therein creating variations among states 
that echo differences in violations noted. In 2011, for example, 
Pennsylvania assessed more than 1000 violations in the Marcellus 
Shale yet took only 213 enforcement actions.96 Of the violations 
identified in New Mexico’s tight sands, a noncomprehensive set from 
2000 through 2011, approximately 21% resulted in clear enforcement, 
such as a penalty or compliance order, and about 17% resulted in less 
formal enforcement—records for these latter violations indicated 
only that compliance was “resolved.”97   
Several factors likely contribute to variations in enforcement 
among states. First, states record violations and enforcements 
differently. Pennsylvania maintains a relatively comprehensive list,98 
while records for Texas only include violations that led to 
enforcement.99 Second, in some cases, operators quickly fix problems 
noted by inspectors,100 thereby mooting any necessary enforcement, 
unless states wish to issue a penalty to deter future violations. In 
other cases, agencies do not have independent powers to issue 
penalties and thus may engage only in limited enforcement, such as 
entering into compliance orders.101 In New Mexico in 2009, for 
example, the state supreme court interpreted New Mexico’s statutes 
to prevent the Oil Conservation Commission from issuing its own 
civil penalties for environmental violations; penalties had to be sought 
 
 95.  For a comparison of violations, numbers of fines, total amounts fined, and other 
enforcement data in twelve states, see Ground Rules: Managing America’s Oil & Gas Boom, 
E&E NEWS, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/special_reports/ground_rules (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2012). For the definition of enforcement followed in this article, see supra note 62. 
 96.  PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62. 
 97.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68. 
 98.  See, e.g., PA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 62. 
 99.  See TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65. 
 100.  See. e.g., MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at 
PERMIT NO. 30-045-29580, INCIDENT NO. nRMD1010239182 (noting that “gasket on compressor 
released natural gas,” that a violation was noted, and that the problem was “immediately 
corrected”); E-mail from Leslie Savage, supra note 65. 
 101.  See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.5.10(E) (allowing the director of the Oil Conservation 
Division to “enter into an agreed compliance order with an entity against whom compliance is 
sought to resolve alleged violations of any provision of the Oil and Gas Act”). Marbob Energy 
Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 206 P.3d 135, 137 (N.M. 2009), invalidated this 
provision’s granting of penalty issuance authorities to the division but did not appear to remove 
other enforcement authorities. See id. at 143 (only invalidating the portion of the code 
“pertaining to the Commission’s and the Division’s authority to impose penalties”). 
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through the attorney general.102 The Texas Railroad Commission, on 
the other hand, may issue penalties and even take criminal action in 
limited circumstances.103 
The most important factor leading to variations among 
enforcements may be the type and degree of violation. A failure to 
obtain a permit for a deep well that poses particular casing challenges, 
for example, could be far more serious than a permitting omission for 
another well. Similarly, spills of unknown contaminants may be toxic 
or benign, with no indication in the violation data. 
The range of enforcement actions taken by states in response to 
violations is summarized in Table 2, with the highest penalty for each 
state in each category shown, where available. 
 
Table 2. Enforcement Actions: Examples of Violations and Penalties 
 
 Louisiana  Michigan  New Mexico Texas 
Permitting 
& reporting  
Failure to obtain 
work permit be-
fore completing 
well, file com-
pletion report, 
etc.  
 
Agreed order, 
$1000
104
 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided 
Failure to obtain 
permit to pro-
duce and 
transport gas  
 
Agreed order, 
$23,500 
Failure to obtain 
permit before 
drilling well 
 
Agreed order, 
$14,500
105
 
Pit construc-
tion & 
maintenance  
High levels of 
arsenic, sele-
nium, etc. at 
reserve pit clo-
sure 
 
Admin. order to 
take appropriate 
remedial ac-
tion
106
 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided 
Water above 
liner in pit 
 
Agreed order, 
$5000
107
  
Apparent failure 
to properly de-
water, backfill 
reserve pit  
 
Agreed order, 
$1000
108
 
 
 102.  Marbob, 206 P.3d at 137 (invalidating Section 19.15.5.10(B)(2) of the New Mexico 
Administrative Code, which attempted to give the Commission the independent authority to 
issue civil penalties). 
 103.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 90. 
 104.  LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 240195. 
 105.  TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NOS. 0637567, 
232848, 233600, DOCKET NOS. 09-0259689, 09-0259690. 
 106.  LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NOS. 240662, 238448. 
 107.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT 
NO. 30-045-32300. 
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 Louisiana  Michigan  New Mexico Texas 
Signs & 
labeling  
Improper I.D. of 
well site and 
tank battery 
 
Admin. order to 
post correct 
sign
109
 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided 
Failure to dis-
play well sign 
 
Agreed order,  
$1000
110
 
No violations 
identified 
Site mainte-
nance  
No violations 
identified 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided 
No violations 
identified 
No violations 
identified 
Surface spill: 
produced 
water  
Salt water load 
line from pro-
duction facility 
left open 
 
Admin. order to 
report clean-up 
methods
111
 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided. 
Spills of 15, 30, 
60 barrels  
 
e.g. notices of 
violation
112
 
No violations 
identified  
Surface spill: 
unidentified 
substance  
No violations 
identified 
Violations noted 
 
No known en-
forcement from 
data provided.  
Small leak of 
unidentified 
substance  
 
e.g. phone call
113
 
Improper dis-
posal violation 
that required 
spill clean-up 
 
Agreed order, 
remediation and 
$15,000
114
 
 
As Table 2 illustrates, given the broad categories in the data 
provided by state agencies, the variability of violations within each 
category is significant. Yet both the violation and enforcement data 
can only tell us so much. More and better data are needed to fully 
assess the range of actions that states are taking to control and 
 
 108.  TEX. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 65, at PERMIT NO. 0612459, 
DOCKET 09-0254013. 
 109.  LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 239513. 
 110.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT 
NO. 30-031-21067. 
 111.  LA. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 67, at PERMIT NO. 23983. 
 112.  MICH., N.M., & WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, supra note 68, at PERMIT 
NO. 30-039-26101, VIOLATION NO. DGF0406442833; PERMIT NO. 30-045-30351, VIOLATION NO. 
DGF0327357057; PERMIT NO. 30-045-31000, VIOLATION NO. DGF0327357057. 
 113.  Id. at PERMIT NO. 30-045-30929, VIOLATION NO. RMD0918334882. 
 114.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., DOCKET NO. 09-0256803 (June 2008), available at 
http://info.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/pubomarchive$omarchive.queryview?P_OM_ID=106201&Z_C
HK=29227. 
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mitigate the effects of shale gas and tight sands development. As the 
Texas Railroad Commission notes, “[t]he [Railroad Commission] has 
a vast store of information that is useful to industry and to the public. 
Unfortunately most of this information is in paper or microfilm 
records that must be copied or viewed in person.”115 Similarly, the 
Arkansas Public Policy Panel, in a report that summarizes more than 
500 violations at Arkansas Fayetteville Shale wells between 2006 and 
2011, argues that the Arkansas Department of Environmental 
Quality should make information on enforcement and violations 
“readily available to citizens” and should improve its 
recordkeeping.116 It notes that many files, for example, do not contain 
any information on staff follow-up after staff initially noted a 
violation.  
Indeed, expanded sources of data would benefit all involved. 
They would allow state agencies to show the efforts that they are 
taking to record and prevent environmental damage—as the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection117 and New 
Mexico Oil Conservation Commission118 already do on their 
websites—and it would allow the public to assess progress. 
Additionally, industry would have a better idea of the types of 
violations that tend to occur and how to avoid them. Publishing 
enforcement data, in particular, could have a deterrent effect. 
Unfortunately, the agencies that have the data are already 
overwhelmed by the responsibilities of inspecting new wells, issuing 
enforcements, and, in some cases, revising regulations. More funding 
is necessary to support these substantive efforts as well as to improve 
datasets.  
Overall, although agencies’ enforcement and inspection 
capacities vary, the violations discussed in part I.B., above, show that 
states are, to different degrees, striving to apply the regulations for 
which they are responsible and to take enforcement actions where 
appropriate. The regulations that tend to dominate inspection, 
violation, and enforcement records, however, suggest that some of the 
 
 115.  R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., SELF-EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 51, at 14. 
 116.  ARKANSAS PUB. POL’Y PANEL, VIOLATIONS OF WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FROM 
GAS PRODUCTION IN ARKANSAS 8 (2011), available at http://arpanel.org/content/ 
Violations%20of%20Water%20Standards.pdf. 
 117.  See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE: TOUGH REGULATIONS, 
GREATER ENFORCEMENT (2011), available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/ 
Get/Document-84024/0130-FS-DEP4288.pdf. 
 118.  See, e.g., N.M. ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP’T, supra note 80 (showing a 
list of surface pits that have contributed to groundwater contamination in New Mexico). 
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oil and gas regulations most commonly applied are not grounded in 
environmental protection,119 and that states are not prioritizing certain 
regulations in their inspection efforts. This is understandable in light 
of agencies’ sometimes conflicting mandates to ensure oil and gas 
conservation, protect various mineral rights, and protect the 
environment. While these are all worthy goals, it is possible that the 
focus on conservation and mineral rights protection sometimes 
displaces efforts to ensure environmental protection.120 This may be 
problematic as hydraulic fracturing allows for the development of 
thousands of new wells around the country, thus substantially 
expanding the risk of negative environmental impacts.  
CONCLUSION 
 Hydraulic fracturing for natural gas and oil in shales has changed 
the American energy landscape and has immensely expanded state 
responsibilities for environmental protection. States have core 
regulatory authority over drilling and fracturing operations, and as 
the number of wells drilled has quickly risen, many agencies face 
overwhelming responsibilities. Inspectors are traveling to well sites, 
noting violations, and, in some cases, taking enforcement action. 
 
 119.  Many of the violations noted, for example, are associated with failures to obtain a 
permit prior to well development or the sale or transportation of gas and failures to post 
adequate signs on sites. See, e.g., MICH., N.M., AND WYO. VIOLATIONS AND ENFORCEMENTS, 
supra note 68. Regulations that require permits and signage are central to environmental 
protection because they put the agency on notice of the well and allow the agency to inspect the 
well once it is constructed. See, e.g., R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., OIL & GAS FILING CHECKLIST 
FROM PROSPECT TO PRODUCTION, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/forms/forms/og/checklist.php (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2012) (noting that operators must “[n]otify the District Office at least 8 hours 
prior to running and cementing surface casing”). They are also, however, intended to notify the 
agency of the existence of the well to allow it to carry out its other duties of ensuring oil and gas 
conservation (by limiting the amount of oil or gas that may be produced from the well, for 
example, and collecting production data) and protecting other mineral owners’ rights. See, e.g., 
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(c) (requiring a plan to be filed with the Railroad Commission that 
must show, among other things, “all adjoining surrounding properties and completed wells in 
the same field and reservoir within the prescribed minimum between-well spacing distance of 
the applicant’s well”). 
 120.  Cf. Soraghan, Protecting Oil From Water, supra note 57 (noting that “many of those 
agencies that were in charge of controlling production are now responsible for protecting people 
and the environment from the industrial hazards of the industry” and quoting a West Virginia 
administrator as stating that the agency tasked with regulating oil and gas wells has “not evolved 
to a point of considering the total impact of all the activity that’s going on in a given area”); 
Mike Soraghan, 40% of State Drilling Regulators Have Industry Ties, GREENWIRE, Dec. 19, 
2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/12/19/1 (noting that “most of the state oil 
and gas agencies are expected to both police and promote the industry” and that the oil and gas 
regulatory system began with the “goal of controlling production and protecting oil from water 
rather than protecting the environment”). 
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Some states, like Pennsylvania, have issued substantial penalties yet 
still experience a significant number of violations of state 
environmental laws. Penalties may not be adequately deterring 
sloppy drilling and fracturing activity, or the state may be unusually 
active in noting violations that other states have missed. The types of 
violations noted among states vary significantly, suggesting that some 
are simply focusing on different problems, that different companies 
cause different environmental harms, or that local conditions cause 
these harms to vary. The presence of more surface water, for 
example, will likely lead to more violations of state water quality 
laws. Enforcements also fall along a continuum, from no action to 
severe penalties, with variations again likely arising from a range of 
factors—some due to legitimate differences,121 and others perhaps 
arising from insufficient agency will or capacity to enforce.  
Beyond the need for improved violation and enforcement data, 
state legislatures should more carefully consider the roles of the 
agencies tasked with the bulk of oil and gas monitoring and 
enforcement. Oil and gas agencies often wear several hats, including 
ensuring that oil and gas are not wasted when produced, that 
neighboring owners are not unfairly drained, and, finally, that the 
environment is protected. In some cases, states may need to consider 
whether these tasks require excessive juggling on the part of agencies, 
or even create conflicts.122 State agencies responsible for licensing new 
wells that benefit from severance taxes, at least indirectly, and other 
revenue from these wells also face competing incentives to encourage 
production while ensuring environmental protection.123   
Some agencies may also be focusing on the wrong details, such as 
violations that are easy to spot. Field inspectors may easily note a 
missing sign at a site or an obvious spill at the surface, while other 
potential effects are hidden and risk being overlooked. Ensuring 
more thorough inspections, however, will require improved staff 
training and testing equipment, which raises a final, important point. 
Just as agencies may lack adequate resources and may be focusing on 
 
 121.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 39 (describing states’ enforcement policies and 
actions taken prior to formal enforcement, such as notices of violation followed by voluntary 
compliance). 
 122.  See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Drilling Regulators Pull Double Duty as Industry Promoters, 
GREENWIRE, Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/11/30/1. 
 123.  Cf. Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm’n, Rule A-7, Ark. Admin. Code 178.00.1-A-7 
(explaining that the Commission sets well categories, which another agency then uses to 
determine severance tax rates). 
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the wrong environmental problems, they may also lack the power to 
adequately enforce violations of environmental laws. Legislatures 
must revisit agency functions and ensure that they have the power to 
assess penalties of a sufficiently high amount to ensure deterrence 
and to make operators pay for the environmental externalities that 
they produce.124 Pennsylvania offers some of the most aggressive 
examples of forcing polluters to pay: In February 2011, for example, it 
issued a total of $565,000 in civil penalties against one energy 
company for wetlands encroachment, erosion and sedimentation 
violations, and a well blowout during fracturing.125  
As the drilling and fracturing of wells rushes forward, states are 
revising regulations, inspecting well sites, and translating violations 
into enforcement. The data set, in the meantime, continues to grow, 
providing more lessons about the types of effects caused by 
fracturing, the best means of avoiding these effects, and the violations 
that are being overlooked or are simply uncommon. These lessons 
suggest that states face a daunting task: some violations appear to 
have caused substantial environmental harm, yet well numbers are 
rising quickly and state officials often may not have the resources, the 
will, or the authority to keep up. This preliminary analysis of 
regulations as they are applied by states is in anticipation of future, 
more detailed work. Hopefully, data and improved analysis of 
existing violations and enforcement matters will provide a more 
thorough understanding of how to properly enforce regulations. This 
understanding is vital; dusty text within codes tells only a partial 
regulatory story.  
 
 124.  The Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, for example, has proposed that “[c]ivil 
penalties for violations of the Oil and Gas Act should be increased from $25,000 to $50,000 and 
the daily penalty should be increased from $1000/day to $2000/day.” MARCELLUS SHALE 
ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 105. It also argues that the DEP should be able to assess 
penalties itself. Id. 
 125.  Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Fines Chesapeake Appalachia $565,000 
for Multiple Violations (Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/ 
portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=19258&typeid=1; Mike Soraghan, Pa. Well 
Blowout Tests Natural Gas Industry on Voluntary Fracking Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/04/04greenwire-pa-well-blowout-tests-natural-gas-
industry-on-36297.html (describing Chesapeake’s April 2011 well blowout during fracturing). 
